SMU Law Review
Volume 17

Issue 3

Article 10

January 1963

Abolition of the Interspousal Immunity in Community Property
States
Neil Weatherhogg

Recommended Citation
Neil Weatherhogg, Note, Abolition of the Interspousal Immunity in Community Property States, 17 SW L.J.
480 (1963)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol17/iss3/10

This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been
accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information,
please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17

for creating a danger to his servants because the creation is unreasonable, it seems that the servant should be barred from recovery
for taking a chance only if such chance amounts to contributory
negligence.
Richard M. Hull

Abolition of the Interspousal Immunity in
Community Property States
The wife brought action against the husband in a California court
for an assault committed upon her person during coverture. An
action for divorce was then pending. The husband moved for summary judgment on the ground that a wife cannot sue a husband for
a tort in California. The motion for summary judgment was granted;
judgment for the husband was entered by the trial court. Held,
reversed: The interspousal immunity is abolished; one spouse may
sue the other for an intentionaltort.1 Self v. Self, - Cal. 2d -, 376
P.2d 65 (1962). The wife sued the husband alleging that she slipped
and broke her leg while walking on the deck of the husband's boat
(in which she had no right, title or interest). It was further alleged
that the husband negligently caused the slippery condition and failed
to give warning of the unsafe condition of which he had knowledge.
The husband demurred on several grounds; the principal one was
the alleged incapacity of the wife to sue the husband during coverture. The demurrer was sustained without leave to amend on the
ground that one spouse may not sue the other in California for a
personal tort, and judgment was entered in favor of the husband.
Held, reversed: The interspousal immunity is abolished; one spouse
may sue the other for a negligent tort. Klein v. Klein, - Cal. 2d -,
376 P.2d 70 (1962).
I. THE Two

APPROACHES-DEVELOPMENT AND RATIONALE

At early common law, husband and wife were a legal unit with

the identity of both merged in the husband.! A wife could not sue
"SKeeton, op. cit. supra note 40, at 118.
' The doctrine which prevents suits between -spouses is sometimes referred to as "spousal
immunity" and other times as "spousal disability." No distinction of substance is intended;
a plaintiff-spouse is under a disability when a defendant-spouse has an immunity. However,
in order to distinguish between these cases and instances where wives suffer under the
general coverture disability and cannot sue or be sued by anyone including their husbands,
the term "immunity" is employed hereafter to refer to interspousal suits.
a1 Blackstone, Commentaries 442 (1765); 2 Blackstone, Commentaries 443 (1766).
Similarly, at Roman law, the wife was under her husband's authority (manus) and had
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anyone without her husband's joinder,' and one spouse could not sue
the other for a tort committed upon either his or her person' or
property 5 by the other spouse. Suits for divorce were exceptions to
the general rule against interspousal suits.' Also, courts of equity
treated husband and wife as separate individuals for the purpose of
litigating certain property rights and interests relating to the wife's
separate estate.!
Many of the common-law disabilities of the wife have been removed during the nineteenth century by the widespread enactment
of statutes granting married women additional rights.8 Nonetheless,
because of the disparate interpretations given those statutes, two
different views as to interspousal immunity have developed. The
critical question is whether the statutes are to be construed as preserving or abolishing the fundamental unity of husband and wife
in the area of personal torts. In the leading case of Thompson v.
Thompson,' the Supreme Court held that a District of Columbia
statute "0did not create a new cause of action in the wife against the
husband, but merely authorized the wife to sue in her own name
in tort actions which at common law had to be brought in both
their names. Therefore, in states that follow Thompson," the wife
can sue in her own name, but she cannot sue her spouse. In those
states not following the Thompson holding," the argument continues
to be advanced that the statutes abrogate the rule of spousal immunity." In these states, a wife can sue in her own name and can
also sue her husband in tort.
The courts in a majority of jurisdictions continue to adhere to
the common-law rule that one spouse has no right of action against
the other for damages arising from personal injuries.'4 Moreover,
no separate legal personality. Radin, Roman Law 40 (1927); Sohm, Institutes of Roman
Law 459 (3d ed. 1907).
3
See Hawkins v. Front St. Cable Ry., 3 Wash. 592, 28 Pac. 1021 (1892), and Barton,
The Impact of the Community Property System on Tort Suits, 42 Calif. L. Rev. 486, 493
(1954).
4 27 Am. Jur. Husband & Wife § 589 (1940).
5Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 100 So. 591 (1924); See Annot., 33 A.L.R. 1388
(1924).
63 Vernier, American Family Laws § 180 (1935).
727 Am. Jur. Husband F Wife §§ 585, 586 (1940).
'See McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1030
(1930).
"218 U.S. 611 (1910).
"°D.C. Code Ann. § 30-208 (1926), 31 Stat. 1189, 1374 (1901).
"See note 14 infra for a list of the states.
" See note 20 infra for a list of the states following the minority view.
1CAnnot., 43 A.L.R.2d 626 (1955); see also Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611,
622 (1910) (dissenting opinion).
14 Delaware: Ferguson v. Davis, 48 Del. 299, 102 A.2d 707 (1954)
(negligence);
District of Columbia: Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1P10) (intentional tort);
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in at least two jurisdictions, statutes have been enacted to specifically
abrogate the right of the spouses to sue each other." In order to
reconcile the continued application of the spousal immunity doctrine
in the area of personal torts with the emancipation of women by
statute, these courts advance several arguments. Some hold that a
Florida: Corren v. Corren, 47 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1950) (negligence); Georgia: Wright v.
Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952)
(negligence), and cases cited therein;
Holman v. Holman, 73 Ga. App. 205, 35 S.E.2d 923 (1945) (intentional tort); Illinois:
Heckendorn v. First Nat'l Bank, 19 11. 2d 190, 166 N.E.2d 571 (1960) (intentional
tort against husband's administrator), and cases cited therein; Indiana: Hunter v.
Livingston, 125 Ind. App. 427, 123 N.E.2d 912 (1955)
(negligence); Blickenstaff v.
Blickenstaff, 89 Ind. App. 529, 167 N.E. 146 (1929)
(negligence), and cases cited
therein; Iowa: In re Dolmage's Estate, 203 Iowa 231, 212 N.W. 553 (1927) (intentional
tort); Peters v. Peters, 42 Iowa 182 (1875)
(intentional tort; this is often cited for the
majority position); Kansas: Sink v. Sink, 172 Kan. 217, 239 P.2d 933 (1952) (negligence),
and cases cited therein; Louisiana: Gremillion v. Caffey, 71 So. 2d 670 (La. App. 1954)
(intentional tort); Addison v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 64 So. 2d 484 (La. App.
1953) (negligence; both Louisiana cases holding that, although the wife technically has a
cause of action, the right to sue is abrogated); Maine: Gray v. Gray, 87 N.H. 82, 174
Atl. 508 (1934) (negligence, stating Maine rule); Maryland: Ennis v. Donovan, 222 Md.
536, 161 A.2d 698 (1960) (negligence); Massachusetts: Lubowitz v. Taines, 293 Mass.
39, 198 N.E. 320 (1935)
(negligence); Michigan: Kircher v. Kircher, 288 Mich. 669,
286 N.W. 120 (1939) (negligence), and cases cited therein; Minnesota: Shumway v. Nelson,
259 Minn. 319, 107 N.W.2d 531 (1961) (negligence); Karalis v. Karalis, 213 Minn. 31,
4 N.W.2d 632 (1942)
(negligence), and cases cited therein; Mississippi: Ensminger v.
Ensminger, 222 Miss. 799, 77 So. 2d 308 (1955)
(negligence), and cases cited therein;
Missouri: Brawner v. Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. 1959) (negligence), and cases cited
therein; Montana: Conley v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 98 Mont. 31, 37 P.2d 565
(1934) (negligence), and cases cited therein; Nebraska: Emerson v. Western Seed & Irr.
Co., 116 Neb. 180, 216 N.W. 297 (1927) (negligence); Nevada: Kennedy v. Kennedy,
72 Nev. 302, 353 P.2d 833 (1960) (negligence); New Jersey: Long v. Landy, 35 N.J. 44,
171 A.2d 1 (1961) (negligence), and cases cited therein; New Mexico: Rodgers v. Galindo,
68 N.M. 215, 360 P.2d 400 (1961) (negligence), and cases cited therein; North Carolina:
Scholtens v. Scholtens, 230 N.C. 149, 52 S.E. 350 (1949) (negligence; only applicable to
suits by a husband against a wife; the courts have permitted the wife to sue the husband);
Jernigan v. Jernigan, 236 N.C. 430, 72 S.E.2d 912 (1952); Oregon: Kowaleski v.
Kowaleski, 227 Ore. 45, 361 P.2d 64 (1960) (negligence; interspousal immunity does not
apply to intentional torts); Smith v. Smith, 205 Ore. 286, 287 P.2d 572 (1955) (negligence); Pennsylvania: Kaczorowski v. Kalkosinski, 321 Pa. 438, 184 Atl. 663 (1936)
(negligence); Rhode Island: Kelley v. Kelley, 51 R.I. 173, 153 Atl. 314 (1931) (intentional
tort of trespass and ejectment); Oken v. Oken, 44 R.I. 291, 117 Atl. 357 (1922);
Tennessee: Gordon v. Pollard, 207 Tenn. 45, 336 S.W.2d 25 (1960) (negligence); Lillienkamp v. Rippetoe, 133 Tenn. 57, 179 S.W. 628 (1915) (intentional tort), and cases cited
therein; Texas: Nickerson v. Nickerson, 65 Tex. 281 (1886) (intentional tort; see note
33 infra); Gowin v. Gowin, 292 S.W. 211 (Tex. Comm. App. 1924) (intentional tort);
Latiolais v. Latiolais, 361 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) (negligence); Vermont:
Comstock v. Comstock, 106 Vt. 50, 169 Ati. 903 (1934) (negligence); Virginia: Keister
v. Keister, 123 Va. 157, 96 S.E. 315 (1918) (intentional tort); Washington: Goode v.
Martinis, 58 Wash. 2d 229, 361 P.2d 941 (1961) (intentional tort), and cases cited therein;
West Virginia: Campbell v. Campbell, 145 W. Va. 245, 114 S.E.2d 406 (1960) (negligence),
and cases cited therein; Wisconsin: Fehr v. General Acc. Fire & Liab. Assur. Corp., 246
Wis. 228, 16 N.W.2d 787 (1944) (negligence; although the husband has no right of
action against his wife, the wife does against the husband); Wyoming: McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 135 P.2d 940 (1943) (negligence).
"See Hindman v. Holmes, 4 Ill. App. 2d 279, 124 N.E.2d 344 (1955), Ill. Rev. Stat.
ch. 68, § 1 (1961); Palmer v. Edwards, 155 So. 483 (La. App. 1934), La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. $ 9:291 (1961).
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change in the rule is a matter for the legislature."6 Others state
that a personal action between husband and wife would destroy the
peace and harmony of the home and thus would be contrary to
the policy of the law." Also, if marital suits were permitted, it has
been predicted that there would be an increase in vexatious litigation-some of which would be collusive. 6 Finally, courts have urged
that adequate remedies are provided by divorce and criminal courts."
A minority of the jurisdictions permit a person to sue his or her
spouse for personal injuries as if the two were not married.'" Justice
' See Paulus v. Bauder, 106 Cal. App. 2d 589, 235 P.2d 422 (1951); Cubbison v.
Cubbison, 73 Cal. App. 2d 437, 166 P.2d 387 (1946), overruled by principal cases.
17 In Ritter v. Ritter, 31 Pa. 396 (1858), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
"The flames which litigation would kindle on the domestic hearth would consume in an
instant the conjugal bond, and bring on a new era indeed-an era of universal discord, of
unchastity, or bastardy, of dissoluteness, of violence, cruelty, and murders." Id. at 398.
lSAbbott
v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 308 (1877).
9
. See Cohen v. Cohen, 66 F. Supp. 312 (N.D. Tex. 1946).
(negligence);
'°Alaska: Cramer v. Cramer, 379 P.2d 95 (Alaska Sup. Ct. 1963)
Arizona: No Arizona case in point. But, see Jaeger v. Jaeger, 262 Wis. 14, 53 N.W.2d 740
(1952), applying Arizona law and citing Hageman v. Vanderdoes, 15 Ariz. 312, 138
Pac. 1053 (1914), for the proposition that the unity of husband and wife has been
severed. Arkansas: Katzenberg v. Katzenberg, 183 Ark. 626, 37 S.W.2d 696 (1931)
(negligence); seealso Lucas v. Phillips, 205 Tenn. 444, 326 S.W.2d 905 (1957) (Tennessee
court applying Arkansas law); Colorado: Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P.2d 740
(1935)
(negligence); Connecticut: Overlock v. Ruedemann, 147 Conn. 649, 165 A.2d
335 (1960) (negligence), and cases cited therein; Ginsberg v. Ginsberg, 126 Conn. 146,
9 A.2d 812 (1939) (negligence), and cases cited therein; Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42,
89 Atl. 889 (1914) (intentional tort); Williamson v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co.,
19 Conn. Supp. 59, 109 A.2d 896 (1954) (negligence); Idaho: Lorang v. Hays, 69 Idaho
440, 20 P.2d 733 (1949) (intentional tort); Kentucky: Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d
480 (Ky. 1953); Missouri: Ennis v. Truhitte, 306 S.W.2d 549 (Mo. 1957) (action by wife
against her husband's administrator for negligence of the husband, even though Missouri
does not permit actions between the spouses); New Hampshire: Morin v. Letourneau, 102
N.H. 309, 156 A.2d 131 (1959) (negligence), and cases cited therein; New Jersey: Koplik
v. C. P. Trucking Corp., 47 N.J. Super. 196, 135 A.2d 555 (1957) (negligence; when
plaintiff married defendant pendente lite, the action was not abated and suit could be maintained, even though New Jersey does not permit action between spouses for torts committed
during coverture); New York: Coster v. Coster, 289 N.Y. 438, 46 N.E.2d 509 (1943)
(negligence; all recent cases, decided under a New York statute (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law §
57 (1937)), specifically permit a suit by husband or wife against the other for personal
injuries. The statute, in effect, overruled a long series of New York cases which supported
the common law rule of spousal immunity.); Lee v. Lee, 184 Misc. 686, 57 N.Y.S.2d 97
(Sup. Ct. 1945) (intentional tort), and cases cited therein; North Carolina: Jernigan v.
Jernigan, 236 N.C. 430, 72 S.E.2d 912 (1952) (wife may sue husband, but husband cannot sue wife); North Dakota: Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 62 N.D. 191, 242 N.W. 526
(1932) (negligence); Ohio: Damm v. Elyria Lodge No. 465, 158 Ohio St. 107, 107 N.E.2d
337 (1952) (negligence); Oklahoma: Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660
(1938) (negligence); Fiedler v. Fiedler, 42 Okla. 124, 140 Pac. 1022 (1914)
(intentional tort); Oregon: Apitz v. Dames, 204 Ore. 242, 287 P.2d 585 (1955) (abrogated
common-law rule of interspousal immunity only as to intentional torts); see Kowaleski v.
Kowaleski, 227 Ore. 45, 361 P.2d 64 (1960) (immunity exists in negligence cases); South
Carolina: Pardue v. Pardue, 167 S.C. 129, 166 S.E. 101 (1932) (negligence); Prosser v.
Prosser, 114 S.C. 45, 102 S.E. 787 (1920) (intentional tort); South Dakota: Scotvold v.
Scotvold, 68 S.D. 53, 298 N.W. 266 (1941)
(negligence); Utah: Taylor v. Patten, 2
Utah 2d 404, 275 P.2d 696 (1954) (intentional tort); Wisconsin: Wait v. Pierce, 191
Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 475 (1926) (negligence; limited to actions by wife against husband);

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17

5
Harlan's dissent in Thompson v. Thompson"
is the forerunner of
the arguments advanced in support of this viewpoint. These jurisdictions regard as untenable the majority view that suppression
of interspousal suits promotes domestic tranquility because "such
[disharmony] is accomplished by the desire to recover as fully as
by the recovery."2 Moreover, the "tranquility" argument is said
to be inapplicable to those cases that have prevented the suit for a
tort committed during coverture even after a divorce, 2 annulment, 4 separation,"2 or the death of one spouse or even both."
The majority viewpoint is characterized as a "bald theory" which
assumes "that after a husband has beaten his wife, there is a state
of peace and harmony left to be disturbed; and that if she is sufficiently injured or angry to sue him for it, she will be soothed and
deterred from reprisals by denying her the legal remedy.
"52
Some jurisdictions following the minority view indicate that if
the right to suit were denied, the injured party would have no
adequate remedy. s It has also been suggested that the majority doctrine defeats just claims of innocent members of a family and protects wrongdoers who would otherwise be responsible for the injuries
they have inflicted." One writer suggests that suits between married
persons need not breed "vexatious litigation" if the courts imply
from the marriage relation consent to do unimportant acts which
are technically torts." However, "in cases of more serious injury
where there is no license, grave injustice is often worked by denial
of a legal remedy." 1

II.

THE PROBLEM IN TEXAS

In Texas, one spouse cannot sue the other for damages arising
from a personal tort, whether negligent" or intentional." Also, a
see also Darian v. McGrath, 214 Minn. 389, 10 N.W.2d 403 (1943), applying Wisconsin
law.
21218 U.S. 611, 619 (1910).
2 Hamilton v. Fulkerson, 285 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Mo. 1955).
23

See Lang v. Lang, 24 N.J. Misc. 26, 45 A.2d 822 (Cir. Ct. 1946).

Callow v. Thomas, 322 Mass. 550, 78 N.E.2d 637 (1948).
25 See Clark v. Clark, 11 F.2d 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1925).
26 See Wright v. Davis, 132 W. Va. 722, 53 S.E.2d 335 (1949).
27 Prosser, Torts § 674 (2d ed. 1955).
24See

28See

Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917); Crowell v. Crowell, 181

N.C. 66, 106 S.E. 149 (1920); Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1938).

'9See Green, The Community Property Defense in Personal Injury and Death Actions,
33 Texas L. Rev. 88, 89 (1954).
3 3 Vernier, op. cit. supra note 6, at § 180.
1
1Id. at § 269.
" Latiolais v. Latiolais, 361 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
22Nickerson v. Nickerson, 65 Tex. 281
(1886). This is the leading case in Texas for
the proposition that one spouse cannot sue the other. Here, the wife sued her husband and
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cause of action for breach of the marriage contract other than
divorce does not exist.8 4 The doctrine of spousal immunity has even
been extended to preclude a husband from suing his wife during
coverture for a pre-marital tort.8" If the tort occurs during marriage,
a subsequent annulment"6 or divorce"7 will not remove the bar to
suit."5 These prohibitions continue after death so that a suit for
damages between representatives of a deceased spouse and the living
spouse cannot be maintained. 9 However, despite the unswerving
precedent which holds that suit cannot be instituted between spouses
for personal injuries, the Texas courts have permitted one partner
to sue the other for the protection of property rights.4 ' Furthermore,
in Worden v. Worden,4' which did not involve property rights,
the Texas Supreme Court stated that a wife could sue her husband
by way of habeas corpus for the custody of their minor child,
although no divorce proceedings were pending, and even though
the wife predicated her action upon misdeeds of the husband. 4
another for the tort of false imprisonment. The court allowed the action against the codefendant who was not her husband and stated that the proceeds were her separate property. This created an exception to the general rule of Ezell v. Dodson, 60 Tex. 331 (1883),
in which it was held that damages to be recovered from a third person for a tort committed upon a wife, by such person alone, would be community property. The Nickerson
court reasoned that if the recoverable damages were community property in this case,
then the husband would profit from his own wrong. This case is widely cited for the
premise that interspousal suits are prohibited in Texas. See Speers, Marital Rights in Texas
at 633 (4th ed. 1961); 30 Tex. Jur. 2d § 143 (1962); Latiolais v. Latiolais, 361 S.W.2d 252
(Tex. Civ. App. 1962); Worden v. Worden, 222 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949),
rev'd on other grounds, 224 S.W.2d 187 (1949); Lunt v. Lunt, 121 S.W.2d 445 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1938); Wilson v. Brown, 154 S.W. 322 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913); Sykes v. Speer,
112 S.W. 422 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909), modified, 119 S.W. 86 (1909); Cohen v. Cohen, 66
F. Supp. 312 (N.D. Tex. 1946).
34Gowin v. Gowin, 292 S.W. 211 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929).
85 Latiolais v. Latiolais, 361 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) error ref. n.r.e.
36Lunt v. Lunt, 121 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
" Sykes v. Speer, 112 S.W. 422 (Tex. Civ, App. 1908), modified, 119 S.W. 86 (1909).
"8Nickerson v. Nickerson, 65 Tex. 281 (1886). "Whatever cause of action the wife
had, accrued when the acts of which she complains were committed; and the fact of
divorce subsequently granted, can not make that a cause of action which was not so at
the time the facts transpired." Id. at 283.
" Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. High, 129 Tex. 219, 103 S.W.2d 735 (1937)
(negligence).
4° Trimble v. Farmer, 157 Tex. 533, 305 S.W.2d 157 (1957); McCartney v. McCartney,
93 Tex. 359, 55 S.W. 310 (1900); Vercelli v. Provenzano, 28 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. Civ. App.
1930); Kelly v. Gross, 4 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) error ref.; Newman v.
Newman, 86 S.W. 635 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905).
In Heintz v. Heintz, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 403, 120 S.W. 941 (1909), the court held that
the wife could sue her husband for conversion of certain monies belonging to her separate
estate. In Borton v. Borton, 190 S.W. 192 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) error ref., the court
stated: "We think it well settled by the cases cited that, besides actions for divorce, a wife
may maintain suit against her husband for the recovery of her separate estate wrongfully
converted by him....
" Id. at 193.
4' 222 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 148 Tex. 356, 224
S.W.2d 187 (1949).
42 224 S.W.2d at 189:
We think that both of the courts below were correct in holding that the
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The decisions in Texas do not reflect any substantial reliance
upon the common-law theory that spousal immunity flows from
the unity of husband and wife." Rather, the hostility to personal
injury actions between husband and wife appears to be based upon
three grounds: (1) a fear that the suit would disrupt domestic
tranquility, " (2) a belief that other adequate remedies exist, 5 and
(3) because a defendant-spouse would share equally in any damages
recovered, which, under well-established Texas law, belong to the
community estate of both.4 ' The first two principles have been diswife had the right to bring this suit. The husband relies on decisions such as
Nickerson v. Nickerson, 65 Tex. 281 [1886], to the effect that the wife may
not sue her husband for personal injuries which he does to her during coverture. It is argued in effect that the present case is analogous because the wife
here relies upon misdeeds of the husband toward her as grounds for securing
relief. We think, however, that this suit is essentially different, because the
principal consideration in this case is the welfare of the child rather than the
rights of the spouses as against each other. No reason of public policy which
might prevent one spouse from suing the other is present here, because the
home has already been broken up and the real issue to be decided is the future
care of the child in the light of this unfortunate actuality.
(Emphasis
added.)
43 Whether the common law with respect to marital rights has been adopted in Texas
is an open question. Compare Gowin v. Gowin, 264 S.W. 529 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924),
aff'd, 292 S.W. 211 (1927), with Barkley v. Dumke, 99 Tex. 150, 87 S.W. 1147 (1905);
Burr v. Wilson, 18 Tex. 368, 370 (1857); Bradshaw v. Mayfield, 18 Tex. 22, 29 (1856).
See also Latiolais v. Latiolais, 361 S.W.2d 252, 253 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) error ref. n.r.e.,
which acknowledged that "the common law of England in regard to spousal disability
[immunity] was never adopted in this state with the intendment that it govern our courts
in the determination of marital rights," but refused the husband recovery.
See Latiolais v. Latiolais, supra note 43:
In this connection we have no hesitancy in adopting the holding and reasoning
of the Minn. Sup. Ct. in Patenaude v. Patenaude, 195 Minn. 523, 263 N.W.
546 (1935), where the sole question was presented of whether a wife could,
during coverture, bring an action against her husband for a tort committed
against her person prior to her marriage to him. The court first stated: 'Quite
generally, one of the reasons why a husband or wife cannot bring suit for a
personal tort against the other, during coverture at least, is that so to do
would disturb and tend to disrupt the marriage and family relations, which
it is the public policy of the state to protect and maintain inviolable.' Id.
at 253.
45 Gowin v. Gowin, 292 S.W. 211 (Tex. Comm. App. 1927). In Cohen
v. Cohen, 66 F.
Supp. 312 (N.D. Tex. 1946), a federal district court considering Texas law said: "The
punishment of the husband who engages in such excesses is in the hands of the government.
Officers of the state, or city, speedily and quickly enter and discipline the assaulting husband
and the annulment courts are open to the wife for excesses and cruelties so visited upon her."

Ibid.
" Welch v. Bauer, 186 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1951); McAdams v. Dallas Ry. & Terminal
Co., 149 Tex. 217, 229 S.W.2d 1012 (1950); Taylor v. Catalon, 140 Tex. 38, 166 S.W.2d
102 (1942); Pickens v. Pickens, 125 Tex. 410, 83 S.W.2d 951 (1935); Lee v. Lee, 112
Tex. 392, 247 S.W. 828 (1923); Gallagher v. Bowie, 66 Tex. 265, 17 S.W. 407 (1886);
T.C. Ry. v. Burnett, 61 Tex. 638 (1884); Ezell v. Dodson, 60 Tex. 331 (1883); Teague
v. Fairchild, 15 S.W.2d 585 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Leatherman,
351 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) error ref. n.r.e.; Ellis v. San Antonio, 341 S.W.2d
508 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) error ref. n.r.e.; Piro v. Piro, 327 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App.
1959) error dism.; Missouri K. & T.R.R. v. Hamilton, 314 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. Civ. App.
1958) error ref. n.r.e.; Bell v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 278 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App.
1954) error ref. n.r.e.; Garrett v. Reno Oil Co., 271 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954)
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cussed above.47 The third reason, the most utilized and the most
equivocal, is analyzed below.
An examination of Texas community property law reveals confusion and inconsistency in the application of the community property defense in the third reason. Obviously, in a community property state," it is pointless to speak of free litigation between married
persons if all recovery is considered the property of both. In Texas,
damages recovered for personal injuries, regardless of the source,
are community property except in three instances: (1) a statute

creates a right of action for the special benefit of the wife,,' (2) the
husband would otherwise benefit from his own wrong, e.g., if the
husband and a third party committed a tort upon his wife," or (3)
a direct invasion of the wife's rights, as in a suit for alienation of
affections."
The following are well-recognized premises of Texas law:
(1) All property acquired by the wife during coverture except
by gift, devise, or descent belongs to the community estate!s
(2) The legislature is prohibited from adding to or taking from
the circumstances specified. "4
error ref. n.r.e.; Roberts v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 142 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940)
error ref., 135 Tex. 289, 143 S.W.2d 79 (1940); Dixie Motor Coach Corp. v. Watson,
138 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940); Texas Cities Gas Co. v. Martinez, 82 S.W.2d 1040
(Tex. Civ. App. 1935); Houston Gas & Fuel Co. v. Spradlin, 55 S.W.2d 1086 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1932); Lincoln v. Stone, 42 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931), rev'd on other
grounds, 59 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933); Feille v. San Antonio Traction Co.,
107 S.W. 367 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908) error ref.; Ainsa v. Moses, 100 S.W. 791 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1907); Vaughn v. St. Louis Sw. Ry., 79 S.W. 345 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904) error ref.;
Galveston H. & S.A. Ry. v. Baumgarten, 72 S.W. 78 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903) error ref.;
Jackson v. Bradshaw, 67 S.W. 438 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902); Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Kelly, 29 S.W. 408 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894); Rice v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 27 S.W. 921
(1894). This is also the general rule followed in many other community property states. See
1 deFuniak, Principles of Community Property § 82 (1943):
Property or money recovered as damages or compensation for personal injuries
sustained by a spouse belongs to the community estate, under the doctrine
usually followed in our community property states. This has been explained
on the ground that the right to recover damages for personal injuries is a
chose in action and property; and this right of action having been acquired
during the marriage is community property, as is, consequently, the damages
or compensation recovered for such personal injuries. ...
47See notes 17, 19, 22-30 supra and accompanying text for both majority and minority arguments.
" The community property defense is simply that the proceeds for recovery for personal injuries are community property, and if one spouse is allowed to recover damages,
then the defendant-spouse will benefit from his own wrong by sharing in the proceedsso the "community property defense" bars the action between spouses.
"' The states of Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and
Washington have community property systems.
"See Wright v. Tipton, 92 Tex. 168, 46 S.W. 629 (1898).
" Nickerson v. Nickerson, 65 Tex. 281 (1886).
"Smith v. Smith, 225 S.W.2d 1001 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
"aTex.
Const. art. 16, § 15.
4
The Supreme Court of Texas, in Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799
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(3) The right to sue for damages for a tort is a chose in
action and, therefore, "property" within the legal sense of that
term.5
(4) This cause of action, not acquired by gift, devise, or descent,
but acquired during marriage, is community property."s
(5) It logically follows that any damages acquired in 57pursuance
of a "community" cause of action are community funds.
However, the same Texas courts have laid down the following
rules, which are inconsistent with the ones above:
(1) Damages received by the wife for personal injuries inflicted
on her by a third person are community property, unless the husband
was a joint tortfeasor, in which case such damages are the separate
property of the wife.5"
(2) Damages received by the wife for personal injuries suffered
as a result of the alienation of the husband's affections are (im-

plied to be)

the separate property of the wife."0

(3) Proceeds of an insurance policy on the life of one spouse,
(1925), declared unconstitutional a statute (Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4614 (1917))
which sought to render the rents and revenues from the wife's separate property likewise
her separate property. The court took the view that the description of the wife's separate
property in the constitution created an implied exclusion of all property not listed and
that the legislature could not validly add to or substract from her separate estate as
described.
" Ezell v. Dodson, 60 Tex. 331 (1883).
'Northern Texas Traction Co. v. Hill, 297 S.W. 778 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927), error ref.
Cf. Fort Worth & R.G. Ry. v. Robertson, 103 Tex. 504, 131 S.W. 400 (1910), adopting
dissenting opinion in 121 S.W. 202 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909), where it was held that a
putative wife has no interest in husband's cause of action for personal injuries following
his death, since it was not acquired by joint efforts; also, Nickerson v. Nickerson, 6 S
Tex. 281 (1886), in which a cause of action of damages was vested in the wife and the
recovery was separate property.
51 deFuniak, op. cit. supra note 46, at S 82.
5 Nickerson v. Nickerson, 65 Tex. 281 (1886).
510 Texas L. Rev. 468 (1932):
It is submitted as axiomatic that if the judgment in Norris v. Stoneham
[46 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932)] represents community property, then
the wife cannot properly sue therefor alone and without joining her husband,
and further that the husband can sue for community property alone because
the wife is not even a proper party to the action. This conclusion is reached
because the opposite result would create between the procedural and substantive law with respect to community property in Texas an anomaly too great
to be countenanced. The impropriety of allowing the wife to sue alone for a
judgment that represents community property, and the still more striking
anomaly of compelling her to join as party plaintiff the husband who incited
the wrong for which she sues, lead to the unavoidable conclusion that there
is no right of recovery whatever in the case if the nature of the recovery
sought is such as to label it community property.
Since the court of appeals in Norris v. Stoneham, 46 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1932), allowed the wife to institute a suit in her own name without
joinder by her husband, for alienation of affections, the recovery by the above
reasoning, although the court did not say, must go to the wife's separate estate.
Id. at 472.
0 Norris v. Stoneham, 46 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
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payable to the other, are the separate property of the beneficiary.61
(4) Compensation for damages to separate property that is
brought into the marriage is separate property," but compensation
for damages to the person, which was also brought into the marriage,
is community property. "
(5) Physical violence by the husband can be the basis of a
suit for divorce," but physical violence cannot be the basis of a
suit for damages."5
Thus, the Texas courts have used various rationales to do what
they have forbidden the legislature to do, viz., to change the constitutional definition of the wife's separate property."6 A more logical
rule would be for the Texas courts to recognize that the wife has a
right of personal security, a right that was recognized even at common law.' Because the right to recover for bodily injury is a personal
right brought into the marriage, damages for injury to that right,
as in the case of property brought into the marriage, should be the
separate property of the injured spouse."6 Another possible basis for
declaring that damages for personal injuries are separate property
lies in the "onerous title" theory, that is, community property consists only of that acquired by labor or industry of the spouses."
61Davis v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 134 Tex. 201, 134 S.W.2d 1042 (1940); Martin v.
McAllister, 94 Tex. 567, 63 S.W. 624 (1901).
62Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Medaris, 64 Tex. 92 (1885); Crosby County Cattle Co. v.
Corn, 25 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928), aff'd, 29 S.W.2d 999 (Tex. Comm. App.
1930); San Antonio & A.P. Ry. v. Flato, 35 S.W. 859 (1896). See Speers, Marital Rights
in Texas 632 (4th ed. 1961): "Now, a spouse has a right to retain separate property unimpaired in value by the unlawful acts of any other person, and when a cause of action
accrues by reason of any damage thereto, the action is in behalf of the separate estate, and
the recovery belongs to the owner of the separate estate in the same right."
63
Ezell v. Dodson, 60 Tex. 331 (1883).
"Mortensen v. Mortensen, 186 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
6"Nickerson v. Nickerson, 65 Tex. 281
(1886).
" Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4614 (4621) (1917), making rents and revenues
from the wife's separate property her separate property was declared unconstitutional in
Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925). Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art.
4615 (4621a) (1925), declaring damages recovered for personal injuries the separate property of the wife, was given effect in Southern Pac. Co. v. Ulmer, 286 S.W. 193 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1926); but in the later case of Fairchild v. Davis, 295 S.W. 640 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1927), the statute was expressly declared unconstitutional and was inferentially so declared by the Texas Commission of Appeals in Teague v. Fairchild, 15 S.W.2d 585 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1929). Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4613 (1925), relating to the rents and
revenues from the husband's separate property was upheld in Stephens v. Stephens, 292 S.W.
290 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) error dism., but was declared unconstitutional in Commissioner v.
Wilson, 76 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1935).
7
" McKay, Community Property 378 (2d ed. 1925).
6sSee, e.g., Underhill v. Anciaux, 68 Nev. 69, 226 P.2d 794 (1951); Fredrickson &
Watson Constr. Co. v. Boyd, 60 Nev. 117, 102 P.2d 627 (1940); Soto v. Vandeventer, 56
N.M. 483, 245 P.2d 826 (1952). See also McKay, op. cit. supra note 67, at 398.
69 See 1 deFuniak, op. cit. supra note 46, at § 82. Also, the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit, Hammonds v. Commissioner, 106 F.2d 420, 425 (1939), has said of the
Texas' community property statute, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4619 (1961): 'Real
property acquired in the state of Texas during coverture by the toil, talent, or productive
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Obviously, a right of action for injuries to the person, reputation, or
compensation received for such injury is not "acquired" by the labor
or industry of the spouses and, therefore, should not be classified
as community property. Application of either the "personal security"
or "onerous title" theories would produce the same result and place
Texas jurisprudence on a sounder, more sensible basis.
III.

THE SOLUTION OFFERED IN CALIFORNIA

The court did not have to face the problem of the community
property defense in the instant cases because the California statute
provides: "All damages, special and general, awarded a married person in a civil action for personal injuries, are the separate property
of such married person." 7 As the court recognized, "Obviously, it
would be incongruous for a wife to sue her husband for a personal
tort as long as the recovery would be community property controlled
and managed by the husband."'" Nevertheless, the court had to
overcome the arguments steeped in stare decisis of spousal immunity
and the impropriety of allowing suits between married persons. The
court answered the common-law rule as first laid down in the Peters'
case with the following statement:
Of course, the general rule is and should be that, in the absence of
statute or some compelling reason of public policy where there is neglifaculty of either spouse is community property. . .. ." This indicates that article 4619 could
plausibly be interpreted on the basis of the onerous title theory.
5
" Cal. Civ. Code § 163.5 (1960). Prior to 1957, both the cause of action and damages
recovered for personal injuries to either spouse were community property in California,
Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 Cal. 2d 321, 202 P.2d 73 (1949). Another California statute provides that "rents, issues, and profits" from separate property are the separate property of
the spouse, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 162, 163 (1960). The Civil Code adds the word "bequest"
and the phrase "with the rents, issues and profits thereof" to the language of the constitution, which reads: "All property, real and personal, owned by either husband or wife before
marriage, and that acquired by either of them afterwards by gift, devise or descent shall be
their separate property." Cal. Const. art. 20, § 8 (1879). Similar Texas statutes making
compensation for injury to the person, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4615 (1917), and
rents, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4614 (1917), from separate property the separate
property of the party were declared unconstitutional. See note 66 supra. The California laws
have the "implied" sanction of the courts. The question of whether the legislature has the
power to enact that a married person can acquire separate property in ways which are not
contained in the constitution was squarely raised in Woodall v. Commissioner, 105 F.2d 474
(9th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 655 (1940). The court stated:
In view of the fact that Section 169, C.C. has on many occasions been before
the courts of the state of California, and passed upon, without question of its
constitutionality, we are disinclined to seize upon a tax case as an opportunity
to declare unconstitutional a legislative enactment standing for nearly 70 years
upon the statute books. . . . We do not regard this provision of the constitution as limiting separate property to that enumerated therein-rather, we regard it as defining a point beyond which the legislature may not encroach upon
the separate property of either spouse. Id. at 478.
7' 376 P.2d at 70.
1 Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 103 Pac. 219 (1909).
This case first established the
common-law notion of the unity of husband and wife in California.
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gence proximately causing an injury, there should be liability. Immunity
exists only by statute or by reason of compelling dictates of public
policy. Neither exists here."a
Klein v. Klein, which involved negligence instead of an intentional
tort, posed more of a problem for the court. An additional, troublesome element is present if one spouse is permitted to sue the other
for negligence, instead of for an intentional tort-the possibility of
fraud and collusion if insurance is involved.'4 However, no compelling reason exists for shielding insurance companies since they have
accepted valuable consideration to insure the defendant spouse against
his own negligence. Absent negligence itself, the insurance company
and the defendant should not be permitted to deny liability because
of the possibility of collusion. One meritorious suggestion is to deny
certain negligence suits on the ground that each party assumes the
risk if there is a common enterprise by husband and wife. " However, if there has been no assumption of the risk, the action in
negligence should be allowed.
IV. CONCLUSION

The Self and Klein cases are illustrative of the modern trend to
abrogate the common-law notion of interspousal immunity. However, in the absence of specific prohibitive legislation, the seven
remaining community property states have a recognized obstacle to
surmount before they can adopt such a rule, viz., the theory that
personal damages are community property and thereby inure to the
benefit of the tortfeasor-spouse. Of these states, Texas, because of
the restrictive interpretation and implied exclusion rule" applied
to the constitutional definition of a wife's separate property, has the
most serious impediment to allowing interspousal tort suits. However, the rationale of the community property defense is inconsistent
if the reasoning applied to property actions between spouses is intentionally overlooked whenever the courts are concerned with the
human body. Until the courts choose to abandon or delimit the
interspousal immunity in community property states and, if neces's 376 P.2d at 69.

Justice Peters, in writing for the majority, stated that such arguments should be made
to the legislature and not to the courts. Justice Schauer, in his dissent, is not persuaded by
this position. He believes that if negligence suits in this area are allowed, the possibility of
collusion will be great.
However, since negligence suits comprise the bulk of trial time, it hardly seems practical
to suggest, as does Justice Schauer, that this area of law be ignored.
753 Vernier, op. cit. supra note 6, at § 180.
76 See note 54 supra.
74

492
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sary, characterize the ensuing damages as separate property, it will
remain a sad day for the law that there can be compensation for a
tree, but not for a hand.
Neil Weatherhogg

